Online Password Guessability via Multi-Dimensional Rank Estimation by David, Liron & Wool, Avishai
Context Aware Password Guessability via Multi-Dimensional Rank Estimation
Liron David
School of Electrical Engineering
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv, 69978, Israel
lirondavid@gmail.com
Avishai Wool
School of Electrical Engineering
Tel Aviv University
Ramat Aviv, 69978, Israel
yash@eng.tau.ac.il
Abstract—Password strength estimators are used to help users
avoid picking weak passwords. Existing probabilistic estima-
tors use various approaches to predict how many attempts a
password cracker would need until it finds a given password.
In this paper we present the first method for estimating
the strength of human-chosen text passwords that is able to
tweak the estimation according to each user’s personal context,
without retraining its model.
Our method is able to incorporate context such as the
user’s name, preferred suffix, or previously cracked passwords
(if available) when estimating the current password’s strength.
Based on a corpus of 1.4 billion leaked passwords, we demon-
strate that there is significant correlation between the user’s
name and the chosen password, and that users’ likelihood of
reusing a password is as high as 22%. Since our method’s
context-aware tweaking only takes a few seconds per password,
our strength estimations show that many passwords are in fact
much weaker than previously estimated, once context is taken
into account.
Our idea is to cast the question in a probabilistic frame-
work used in side-channel cryptography. We view each pass-
word as a point in a d-dimensional search space, and learn
the probability distribution of each dimension separately. The
a-priori probability of a given password is the product of the
d probabilities of its sub-passwords.
After a detailed evaluation of leaked password corpora
we found that an effective choice is to use d = 5 dimensions:
base word, prefix, suffix, shift-pattern, and l33t transformation.
We coupled this decomposition with a state-of-the-art rank
estimation algorithm to create our new PESrank estimator.
We show that PESrank is more powerful than previous
methods: it can crack more passwords, with fewer attempts,
than the password crackers we compared it to. Even without
using per-user context, PESrank is more accurate than previ-
ous methods for crackable passwords whose rank is smaller
than 1012. Furthermore, its training time is drastically shorter
than previous methods, taking minutes, rather than days, to
train on comparably-sized training sets, and taking a few hours
to train on 905 million passwords, which is 8 times more
passwords than previously used.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Text passwords are currently the most popular authen-
tication and are still in widespread use specially for online
authentication on the Internet. Unfortunately, users often
choose predictable and easy passwords, enabling password
guessing attacks. Password strength estimators are used to
help users avoid picking weak passwords. The most precise
definition of password‘s strength is the number of attempts
that an attacker would need in order to guess it [9].
A common way to evaluate the strength of a password
is by running or simulating password-guessing techniques.
Methods such as counts of lower- and uppercase characters,
digits, and symbols (LUDS) have been used to measure
the strength of passwords. Despite it being well-known that
these do not accurately capture password strength [35],
they are still used in practice. More sophisticated pass-
word strength estimators have been proposed e.g., based on
Markov models [27], [23], [11], probabilistic context-free
grammars (PCFGs) [36], [21], neural networks [26], [33]
and others [38], [16].
1.2. Related Work
Password strength measurement often takes one of two
conceptual forms: pure-estimator approaches, and cracker-
based approaches. In the latter, either an actual password
cracker is utilized to evaluate the password strength—or
the meter uses an accurate model of the number of at-
tempts a particular cracker would use until reaching the
given password. In pure-estimator approaches, the model
provides a strength estimate directly from attributes of the
password, without an accompanying passwords cracker that
can achieve the predicted number of attempts.
1.2.1. Pure-Estimator Approaches. The earliest and prob-
ably the most popular methods of password strength esti-
mation are based on LUDS: counts of lower- and uppercase
letters, digits and symbols. The de-facto standard for this
type of method is the NIST 800-63 standard [3], [15]. It
proposes to measure password strength in entropy bits, on
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the basis of some simple rules such as the length of the
password and the type of characters used (e.g., lower-case,
upper-case, or digits). These methods are known to be quite
inaccurate [8] since simple, easily compressible heuristics,
In 2012 Wheeler proposed an advanced password
strength estimator [37], that extends the LUDS approach
by including dictionaries, considering l33t speak transfor-
mations, keyboard walks, and more. Due to its easy to
integrate design, it is deployed on many websites. The
meter’s accuracy was later backed up by scientific analysis
[38].
In 2018 Guo et al. [16] proposed a lightweight client-
side meter. It is based on cosine-length and password-edit
distance similarity. It transforms a password into a LUDS
vector and compares it to a standardized strong-password
vector using the aforementioned similarity measures.
Such pure-estimator approaches have the advantage of
very fast estimation—typically in fractions of a second—
which makes them suitable for online client-side imple-
mentation. However, they do not directly model adversarial
guessing so their accuracy requires evaluation.
1.2.2. Cracker-Based Approaches. Software tools are
commonly used to generate password guesses [14]. The
most popular tools transform a wordlist using mangling
rules, or transformations intended to model common behav-
iors in how humans craft passwords. Two popular tools of
this type are Hashcat [17] and John the Ripper [28].
These tools typically run until a timeout is triggered.
If they crack the given password before the timeout then
their accuracy is perfect: they can report exactly how many
attempts they used. However, if they fail to crack the pass-
word by the timeout, they do not estimate how many more
attempts would have been necessary. Since they generally
take a long time to run (minutes to hours, depending on the
timeout setting) their usefulness as online strength estima-
tors is limited.
A probabilistic cracker method, based on a Markov
model, was first proposed in 2005 [27], and studied more
comprehensively subsequently [5], [23], [11]. Conceptually,
Markov models predict the probability of the next character
in a password based on the previous characters, or context
characters. In 2009 Weir et al. [36] proposed a method
which uses probabilistic context-free grammars (PCFGs).
The intuition behind PCFGs is that passwords are built
with template structures (e.g., 6 letters followed by 2 digits)
and terminals that fit into those structures. A password’s
probability is the probability of its structure multiplied by
those of its terminals. In 2015 the PCFGs method was
integrated with the technique reported by Komanduri in his
PhD thesis [21]. In 2016 Melicher et al. [26] proposed to
use a recurrent neural network for probabilistic password
modeling.
The basic Markov, PCFGs, and neural-network ap-
proaches generate a long sequence of passwords, and as-
sign each password with an a-priori probability. This one-
dimensional sequence is then sorted in decreasing order of
probability, and stored in a password-candidate DB. Given
a password to crack, the cracker attempts all the passwords
in the DB, in their order, until a match is found. Building
the password-candidate DB can be very time consuming,
and the DB can grow very large. However, if the password-
candidate DB is prepared in advance and indexed, then
measuring the strength of a given password is very fast,
and perfectly accurate.
In [26] the authors also describe a Monte-Carlo method
to sample the password DB and store only the sample for
online password strength measurement. They suggested a
probabilistic calculation to estimate the number of guessing
attempts needed to crack a given password, based on its a-
priori probability calculated by the neural-network, in com-
bination with the stored sample. This Monte-Carlo approach
significantly reduces the DB size, making it suitable for
client-side implementation. However, with the Monte-Carlo
sampling, the neural-network method can be viewed as a
strength estimator, whose accuracy needs to be evaluated.
In our evaluation study we used Ur et al.’s Password
Guessability Service [4] (PGS), which provides access
to the Hashcat [17] and John the Ripper [28] crackers,
and the Markov [27] and PCFGs [36] the neural-network
method [26] using Monte-Carlo methods.
1.3. Contributions
In this paper we present the first method for estimating
the strength of human-chosen text passwords that is able
to tweak the estimation according to each user’s personal
context, without retraining its model.
Our method is able to incorporate context such as the
user’s name, preferred suffix, or previously cracked pass-
words (if available) when estimating the current password’s
strength. Based on the Jason corpus of leaked passwords
[18], which contains 1.4 billion usernames and passwords,
we demonstrate that there is significant correlation between
the user’s name and the chosen password, and that users’
likelihood of reusing a password is as high as 22%. Since
our method’s context-aware tweaking only takes a few
seconds per password, our strength estimations show that
many passwords are in fact much weaker than previously
estimated, once context is taken into account.
Our idea is to cast the question in a probabilistic frame-
work used in side-channel cryptography. We view each
password as a point in a d-dimensional search space, and
learn the probability distribution of each dimension sepa-
rately. This learning process is based on empirical password
frequencies extracted from leaked password corpora, that
are projected onto the d dimensions. Once the d probability
distributions are learned, the a-priori probability of a given
password is the product of the d probabilities of its sub-
passwords.
Using this model, optimal-order password cracking is
done by searching the space in decreasing order of a-priori
password probability, which is analogous to side-channel
key enumeration; likewise, password strength estimation is
analogous to side-channel rank estimation. There is exten-
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sive research and well known algorithms for both problems
in the side-channel cryptanalysis literature.
After a detailed evaluation of leaked password corpora
we found that an effective choice is to use d = 5 dimensions:
base word, prefix, suffix, shift-pattern, and l33t transforma-
tion. We coupled this decomposition with the rank estima-
tion algorithm of [7] to create our new, tweakable, PESrank
estimator.
We compared the ranks calculated by PESrank to the
ranks obtained by five password crackers using the PGS
service [4]. We show that PESrank is more powerful than
previous methods: it can crack more passwords, with fewer
attempts, than the password crackers we compared it to.
Even without using per-user context, PESrank is more accu-
rate than previous methods for crackable passwords whose
rank is smaller than 1012.
Furthermore, its training time is drastically shorter than
previous methods, taking minutes, rather than days, to train
on comparably-sized training sets, and taking a few hours
to train on 905 million passwords, which is 8 times more
than previously used.
We plan to make our Python code implementing PES-
rank publicly-available.
Organization: In the next section we introduce the
background on side-channel key enumeration and rank es-
timation. In Section 3 we describe our multi-dimensional
password model. In Section 4 we describe the dimension
selection process we applied. In Section 5 we discuss the
benefit of using personal context when estimating the pass-
word strength. In Section 6 we discuss modeling password
reuse in the model. In Section 7 we compare PESrank to
other existing methods and discuss our findings. In Section 8
we discuss the lookup time of our PESrank both with and
without using context. We conclude with Section 9.
2. Rank Estimation and Key Enumeration in
Cryptographic Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks (SCA) represent a serious threat to
the security of cryptographic hardware products. As such,
they reveal the secret key of a cryptosystem based on
leakage information gained from physical implementation of
the cryptosystem on different devices. Information provided
by sources such as timing [20], power consumption [19],
electromagnetic emulation [30], electromagnetic radiation
[1], [12] and other sources, can be exploited by SCA to
break cryptosystems.
A security evaluation of a cryptographic device should
determine whether an implementation is secure against such
an attack. To do so, the evaluator needs to determine how
much time, what kind of computing power and how much
storage a malicious attacker would need to recover the key
given the side-channel leakages. The leakage of crypto-
graphic implementations is highly device-specific, therefore
the usual strategy for an evaluation laboratory is to launch
a set of popular attacks, and to determine whether the
adversary can break the implementation (i.e., recover the
key) using “reasonable“ efforts.
Most of the attacks that have been published in the litera-
ture are based on a “divide-and-conquer” strategy. In the first
“divide” part, the cryptanalyst recovers multi-dimensional
information about different parts of the key, usually called
subkeys (e.g., each of the d = 16 AES key bytes can be a
subkey). In the “conquer” part the cryptanalyst combines
the information all together in an efficient way via key
enumeration.
2.1. The Key Enumeration Problem
The cryptanalyst obtains d independent subkey spaces
k1, ..., kd, each of size n, and their corresponding probability
distributions Pk1 , ..., Pkd . The problem is to enumerate the
full-key space in decreasing probability order, from the most
likely key to the least, when the probability of a full key is
defined as the product of its subkey’s probabilities.
A naive solution for key enumeration would be to take
the Cartesian product of the d dimensions, and sort the
nd full keys in decreasing order of probability. However
this approach is generally infeasible due to both time and
space complexity. Therefore several algorithms offering bet-
ter time/space tradeoffs have been devised. The currently
best optimal-order key enumeration is [34], with an O(nd/2)
space complexity, and near-optimal-order key enumeration
algorithms with drastically lower space complexities are
those of [6], [25], [2], [29], [24].
2.2. The Rank Estimation Problem
Unlike a cryptanalyst trying to extract the secret key, a
security evaluator knows the secret key and aims to estimate
the number of decryption attempts the attacker needs to do
before he reaches the correct key, assuming the attacker
uses the SCA’s multi-dimensional probability distributions.
Formally:
The rank estimation problem:. Given d indepen-
dent subkey spaces of sizes ni for i = 1, . . . , d with their
corresponding probability distributions P1, ..., Pd such that
Pi is sorted in decreasing order of probabilities, and given
a key k∗ indexed by (k1, ..., kd), let p∗ = P1(k1) · P2(k2) ·
... · Pd(kd) be the probability of k∗ to be the correct key.
Estimate the number of full keys with probability higher
than p∗, when the probability of a full key is defined as the
product of its subkey’s probabilities.
In other words, the evaluator would like to estimate
k∗’s rank: the position of the key k∗ in the sorted list
of nd possible keys when the list is sorted in decreasing
probability order, from the most likely key to the least.
While enumerating the keys in the optimal SCA-
predicted order is a correct strategy for the evaluator, it is
limited by the computational power of the evaluator. Hence
using algorithms to estimate the rank of a given key, without
enumeration, is of great interest. Multiple rank estimation
algorithms appear in the literature, the best of which are
currently [7], [13], [25]. They all work in fractions of a
second and generally offer sub 1-bit accuracy (so up to a
multiplicative factor of 2).
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3. Multi-Dimensional Models for Passwords
3.1. Overview
The starting point in producing a password strength
estimator is a leaked password corpus. The frequency of
appearance of each leaked password provides an a-priori
probability distribution over the leaked passwords. Given a
hash of an unknown password, trying the leaked passwords
in decreasing frequency order, is the optimal strategy for a
password cracker—if the password at hand is in the corpus.
To crack passwords that are not in the leaked corpus as-is,
password crackers rely on the observation that people often
take a word, which we shall call the base word, and mutate
it using various transformations such as adding digits and
symbols before or after the base word, capitalizing some
of the base word’s letters, or replacing letters by digits or
symbols that are visually similar using “l33t” translations.
Our main observation is that if we can represent the list
of base words as a dimension, and represent each possible
class of transformations as another independent dimension,
we can pose the password cracking problem as a key enu-
meration problem, and similarly, pose the password strength
estimation as a rank estimation problem. Each dimension
should have its own probability distribution: e.g., as we shall
see, for the “suffix” dimension, the most probable in our
training set is the “empty” suffix, with Pr = 0.49, followed
by that of appending a digit ‘1’ (Pr = 0.062) etc. Once we
pose the password strength estimation question this way, we
can use existing algorithms. A multi-dimensional password
cracker would enumerate combinations of base word plus
a transformation in every dimension, in decreasing order
of the product of per-dimension a-priori probabilities. For
each combination it would apply all the transformations to
the base word, and test the password. The matching multi-
dimenmsional password strength estimator decomposes a
given password into its base word and a transformation in
every dimension, uses the model to calculate the a-priori
probability of the password, and then estimates its rank.
Thus, we arrive at the following framework: First, iden-
tify meaningful classes of transformations, and find a suit-
able representation for each as a dimension. Next, build a
probability distribution for each dimension using the training
corpus, to create a model. Finally, use a good rank estima-
tion algorithm with the model and evaluate its performance.
3.2. The Data Corpus
To study the statistical properties of passwords, and
then to train our method, we used Jason’s corpus of leaked
passwords [18]. This corpus contains 1.4 billion pairs of
username and password, compiled from multiple leaked cor-
pora: Yahoo, Target, Facebook, Hotmail, Twitter, MySpace,
hacked PHPBB instances, and many, many more places. We
believe that Jason’s corpus is a superset of the corpora used
to train previous methods.
The “username” field in Jason’s corpus is generally an
email address, e.g., adam1234@gmail.com. It should be
noted that the passwords provided in the corpus are not
necessarily the passwords of the email accounts themselves
(although they could be). Rather, the email addresses pro-
vided were harvested as the username for the breached entity
in question, and the password provided is the password that
was used with that username at the time of the breach.
We eliminated passwords that contain non-ASCII char-
acters. We also eliminated passwords of fewer than 8 char-
acters, in order to make our training comparable to that
of the methods accessible via PGS [4]—in particular, the
PGS implementation of the neural method [26] is trained
on passwords of length 8 or more. The result was a corpus
of 905 million passwords.
From this corpus we sampled 300,000 username-
password pairs, to serve as a test set. We split the test set
into 10 separate samples, of 30,000 passwords each, and
submitted all the sample sets to PGS for evaluation. Of
the remaining passwords, we down-sampled the corpus into
5 different-size training sets, to explore the effect of the
training-set size on the training time and the strength esti-
mations. We used the following sizes for the smaller training
sets: (1) 41 million username-passwords pairs (2) 113 mil-
lion username-passwords pairs (3) 226 million username-
passwords pairs (4) 452 million username-passwords pairs
(5) and finally, 905 million username-passwords pairs.
4. Selecting the Dimensions
Our main goal in selecting the dimensions is generaliza-
tion. For instance, if we recognize that a suffix of ‘1’ has
probability p1, and that the base word ‘iloveyou’ has proba-
bility p2, a 2-dimensional model will implicitly incorporate
the password ‘iloveyou1’, with probability p1 · p2, even if it
does not appear as-is in the training corpus.
4.1. The Basic 3D model
In our simplest model we divide each password into
3 sub-passwords: prefix, base word and suffix. The prefix
consists of all the digits and symbols that appear to the
left of the leftmost letter. The suffix consists of the digits
and symbols that appear to the right of the rightmost letter.
The base word is the string starting with the leftmost letter
and ending with the rightmost letter. The base word can
consist of letters, digits and/or symbols. For example if the
password is the string ‘123abc45!’ the prefix is ‘123’, the
base word is ‘abc’ and the suffix is be ‘45!’. In case there are
no letters in the password, the password itself is considered
to be the base word, and the prefix and suffix are the empty
strings. In case the password starts with a letter, the prefix
is the empty string, and similarly, if the password ends with
a letter, the suffix is the empty string.
4.2. Using The Model
We use this basic 3D model description to demonstrate
the process we followed in training and evaluating it. We fol-
lowed the same process with the other, more sophisticated,
models we describe in subsequent sections.
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4.2.1. The Learning Phase. We first learn the distributions
of the prefix, the base word and the suffix, using one
of the training set sampled from the Jason corpus [18]—
recall Section 3.2. For each password in the training set,
we divide the password into its three sub-passwords, as
described above, and increment the dimensional-frequency
of each sub-password by 1. Finally we normalize the three
lists of frequencies into probability distributions, and sort
them in decreasing order. For instance, in the 3D model,
using the 41 million password training set, the two most
popular base words are ‘a’ (Pr = 0.0046) and ‘password’
(Pr = 0.0035), the two most popular prefixes are the empty
string (Pr = 0.910) and ‘1’ (Pr = 0.0090), and the most
popular suffixes are also the empty string (Pr = 0.497) and
‘1’ (Pr = 0.062).
4.2.2. The Estimation Phase. Given that we know the order
in which a model-based cracker goes over the password
candidates, we can use it to estimate the password guess-
ability. Given a password P , we split into its sub-passwords
P = p∗||b∗||s∗ where p∗ is a prefix, b∗ is a base word, and s∗
is a suffix. With this, using the three probability distributions
P1, P2, P3, we can apply a rank estimation algorithm such as
[7]. The algorithm estimates the number of 3-part passwords
pi||bj ||sk (split in the same way), whose probabilities obey
P1(i) · P2(j) · P3(k) ≥ P1(p∗) · P2(b∗) · P3(s∗).
In other words, it estimates the number of guesses a model-
based cracker would attempt before reaching the given
password P .
If the password P = p∗||b∗||s∗ is not in the model,
which means that at least one of the sub-passwords does
not appear in the corresponding distribution, then we return
-5 (following the behavior of PGS [4] under analogous
conditions).
4.3. 4D: Adding the Shift Pattern
The next level of sophistication is to add another dimen-
sion, to represent the “shift pattern”: the pattern of upper-
case and lower-case letters in the passwords.
To begin with we split a password into its 3D sub-
passwords as in Section 4.1. We only consider the shift
pattern within the base word. Given a base word, it is clear
which of its letters are shifted (upper case) and which are
not. However, we have a choice how to represent the pattern.
The obvious option is to represent the pattern as a binary
string, with a ‘1’ bit in position j indicating that the j’th
letter is capitalized. However, this representation is closely
tied to the word’s length: e.g., position 5 could indicate the
last letter in a 5-letter word, or the before-last letter in a 6-
letter word, etc. Our intuition, and a preliminary inspection
of the Jason [18] corpus, show that people tend to associate
significance to the distance from the word’s end: e.g., cap-
italizing the last letter is fairly common (Pr = 0.0011).
Therefore we elected to represent the shift pattern as a
list of positive and negative indices at which capital letters
appear: The negative indices count from the word end, with
password prefix base word suffix shift pattern
123PassworD 123 password empty [0,-1]
1234567890 empty 1234567890 empty empty
123qweASD 123 qweasd empty [-3,-2,-1]
TABLE 1. 4D DECOMPOSITION EXAMPLES
-1 representing the rightmost letter. The positive indices
count from the word start, with 0 representing the leftmost
letter. To avoid ambiguity, both the negative and the positive
indices do not exceed the middle index.
We augment the 3D learning phase as follows. As in
the 3D case, we divide each password into three sub-
passwords: prefix, base word and suffix. Then, we find the
indices at which there are upper case letters in base word,
and represent their pattern using our positive/negative index
representation. We increment the frequency of the pattern in
the fourth dimension by 1.
Furthermore, before incrementing the base word’s fre-
quency, we “unshift” it, i.e., we ensure that all the base word
letters are in lower case. If there is no letter in the base word,
the password itself is the base word and the shift pattern is
empty. Examples of the 4D decomposition appear in Table 1.
The two most popular shift patterns we found in our training
set are the empty transformation (Pr = 0.923) and ‘[0]’,
representing capitalizing the first letter (Pr = 0.034).
Note that the shift-pattern dimension is not strictly in-
dependent of the base-word dimension: e.g., a shift pattern
t may refer to indices that are outside a short base word
b, or b’s characters at the indexed positions may be sym-
bols or digits (which do not have a capitalized form). In
such cases the transformation t degenerates into the null
transformation. For a model-based password cracker, this
dependence implies some inefficiency, since the cracker will
test the same password multiple times, once for each shift-
pattern that is equivalent to the null transformation for the
current base word. The rank estimation, which assumes
an independence between the dimensions, accounts for the
cracker’s inefficiency. This means that the estimated rank of
a password using the 4D model can actually be viewed as
an over-estimate: a more sophisticated cracker could skip
null transformations and save itself time. As we shall see in
Section 7, despite this structural tendency to over-estimate,
in the experimental evaluation the resulting PESrank al-
gorithm actually under-estimates the “ground-truth” ranks
fairly often—which means that a model-based password
cracker may perform even better.
4.4. 5D: l33t
As observed by [38], it is well documented that people
sometimes mutate passwords using “l33t” transformations:
replacing base-word letters by digits and symbols that are
visually similar. We elected to add the l33t transformation
as a fifth dimension to our model. The l33t transformations
we considered are shown in Table 2.
As in the 4D case (Section 4.3) we need to devise
a representation for the l33t pattern. In principle the l33t
5
original letter l33t
o 0
a [@,4]
s [$,5]
e 3
g [6,9]
t [+,7]
z 2
i [1,!]
x %
TABLE 2. L33T TRANSFORMATIONS
pattern depends on the position of the letter being mutated,
and on the choice of replacement (Table 2 shows that some
letters have more than one l33t replacement). In this case we
elected to ignore the positionality aspect. We numbered the
possible l33t replacements from 1 to 14—e.g., transforming
‘a’ into ‘4’ is transformation 3—and represent the whole l33t
transformation of a base word by a tuple of l33t replacement
numbers. We assume that if a l33t replacement is applied
then it is applied to all the relevant letters in the base word.
So following Table 2, the meaning we associate with a l33t
pattern of ‘[1,3]’ is for the password cracker to “replace all
occurrences of o by 0 and all occurrences of a by 4”.
Note that our representation is unable to represent trans-
formations in which the position matters: e.g., for a base
word ‘aaaaaa’ we cannot represent a l33t pattern that pro-
duces the password ‘aa44@@’.
We make the following changes in the learning phase.
As in the 4D case, we divide each password into four sub-
passwords: prefix, base word, suffix and shift pattern. Then,
we check which l33t replacements were applied to the base
word using the options in Table 2. To prevent a collision
between two different l33t symbols that represent the same
letter, we track only the leftmost replacement (in the base
word) per row in Table 2. For each password we keep a
tuple of all the l33t replacements that were done to the base
word.
We increment the frequency of the tuple in the fifth di-
mension by 1. And as in the 4D model, before incrementing
the the base word’s frequency, we “un-l33t” it using the
detected pattern.
If there are no l33t transformations in the base word, the
base word remains as-is and the l33t pattern is empty.
For example: if the password is ‘g00dPa$$w0rD’, the
prefix is empty, the base word is ‘goodpassword’, the suffix
is empty, the shift pattern is ‘[4,-1]’ and the l33t pattern is
‘[1,4]’.
Note that like the shift pattern in the 4D model (Sec-
tion 4.3), the l33t-pattern dimension is not strictly inde-
pendent of the base-word dimension: e.g., a l33t pattern t
may indicate a replacement of letters that do not appear in
the base word, which means that for this word the pattern
degenerates to another, simpler, l33t pattern, possibly the
empty one. As before, this dependency introduces some
inefficiency to a model-based password cracker, while for
the rank estimation it means that the estimated rank of a
password using the 5D model is actually an over-estimate.
The two most popular l33t patterns in our training set are
the empty transformation (Pr = 0.900) and the l33t pattern
‘4′ → ‘a′ (Pr = 0.007). The total number of l33t patterns
we detected in the corpus is 1596.
4.5. Model Enrichment
As we shall see, using a 5D model gives us good
generalization capabilities beyond the training data. How-
ever, following [22], [32], [10], we know that people have
a tendency to choose passwords that contain dates and
meaningful numbers. To take this observation into account,
we enriched the probability distributions of the prefix, base
word, and suffix dimensions, by adding strings that are not
present in the training corpus. Every string that is added to
a given dimension is added with a frequency  = 0.5, to
account for the fact that it didn’t appear in the corpus. The
resulting frequencies: those computed from the corpus (with
values ≥ 1), together with all enriched  values, are then
normalized into a probability distribution. We tested other
values  6= 0.5 but they all performed similarly as long as
 < 1. If the current enrichment string exists in the corpus
with an empirical frequency f , we update its frequency to
f + . We enriched the model in two ways:
• All the digit sequences of up to 4 digits were added
to the prefix and suffix distributions.
• All the digit sequences of length exactly 6 were
added to the base word distribution.
Note that this enrichment gives good coverage of many
date patterns: adding all the 6-digit strings to the base
words covers all the dates that have patterns of ddmmyy or
yymmdd or mmddyy, and most of the dates with a 4-digit
year, such as 111998 (which could be either 1/Jan/1998 or
Nov/1998). With the prefix and the suffix enrichments we
cover all the 2-digit and 4-digit years such as 98 or 2003.
An 8-digit date, e.g., with a ddmmyyyy format, as a stand-
alone password, is also included in the model as both a
2-digit prefix plus a 6-digit base word, and as a 6-digit base
word plus a 2-digit suffix.
Now for a given password which is composed only of
digits, the enriched model may include several options to
reach this password by the model-based password cracker.
As we saw with an 8-digit date example, a numeric password
can be divided into prefix, base word, and suffix, in different
ways, and the enriched model may include all the sub-
passwords in the respective distributions. To account for
this condition in the rank estimation, we added special
handling of numeric passwords. For such a password, the
PESrank algorithm iterates over all its possible divisions into
3 sub-passwords (of any length): for an `-digit password
there are exactly (` + 1)(` + 2)/2 possibilities. For each
division whose 3 sub-passwords appear in the model we
calculate the password’s probability. Finally, we return the
rank of the division with the highest probability, since this
is the division that will be encountered first by the optimal
enumeration algorithm.
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3D 4D 5D 5D+
Total dimension lengths (·106) 20.11 19.63 19.41 20.41
Size (uncompressed, MB) 615 602 595 641
Size (compressed, MB) 139 132 129 133
Volume 1.73 · 1019 7.73 · 1023 1.21 · 1027 1.28 · 1027
TABLE 3. MODEL SIZE USING THE 41 MILLION PASSWORDS TRAINING SET
4.6. Basic Model Evaluation
In order to evaluate our 4 models we computed for each
model:
1) The percentage of passwords that would be cracked
after a particular number of guesses: in other
words, the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of each model. More powerful guessing methods
guess a higher percentage of passwords in our
test set, and do so with fewer guesses: hence a
better model has a CDF that rises more sharply
and ultimately reaches a higher percentage.
2) The model size: we calculated the Total Dimen-
sion Length—the sum of all the dimensions length
i.e.,
∑d
i=1 ni. This metric counts the total number
of (password-fragment, probability) pairs in the
model. We also calculated the models’ file sizes
(uncompressed and compressed).
3) volume: this is the total number of passwords
that can be reached using our model. When the
model has d dimensions, whose sizes are ni for
i = 1, . . . , d, then volume =
∏d
i=1 ni.
We trained the four models using the 41 million pass-
word training set, and evaluated them using 10 different test
sets (recall Section 3.2). The results are shown in Figure 1.
The 10 graphs of the different test sets look similar, therefore
we show only one of them.
In Figure 1 the x-axis represents the number of guesses
(log scale) and the y-axis shows the corresponding percent-
age of passwords in the test set that can be guessed in that
number of guesses. As we can see, the method becomes
more powerful with each added dimension, successfully
cracking a greater fraction of the passwords, with fewer
attempts.We also see that adding the enrichment by numeric
strings as described in Section 4.5 is very effective.
In Table 3 we can see the model sizes of the different
models. The table shows that the model size decreases with
the Shift (4D) and L33t (5D) dimensions: despite the fact
that additional probability distributions are incorporated, the
base word dimension shrinks due to different passwords
collapsing into the same base word.
The enrichment step (5D+) does not grow the prefix
and the suffix lists since after our training step, on the 41
million password training set, the prefix and the suffix lists
already include all the 4-digits combinations. However, the
enrichment step does increase the base word list by 1 million
6-digit combinations since we excluded passwords of fewer
than 8 characters from training set (including the all-numeric
6-digit passwords in the corpus).
Figure 1. Comparing the four models’ performance on a 30,000 password
test set, as a CDF: Each curve shows the fraction of passwords that can
be cracked in up to r attempts as a function of the rank r (log scale).
Even though the model size remains fairly stable with
the added dimensions, Table 3 shows that the volume grows
dramatically, from a raw corpus of about 108 passwords to a
password volume of 1019 in the 3D model, and by another
8 orders of magnitude reaching about 1027 with the 5D+
model.
We conclude that the enriched 5D+ model is superior
to the simpler alternatives, and it’s size is well within the
capabilities of modern computers. In the remainder of this
paper we use this enriched 5D+ model.
4.7. Training Time
We tested our Python implementation of PESrank’s
training on a 3.40GHz core 7 PC running Windows 8.1
64-bit with 32GB RAM. Figure 2 shows the time to train
PESrank as a function of the training set size. The figure
shows that the PESrank training phase is quite fast—much
faster than reported for previous methods. It takes only
12 minutes to train PESrank on a corpus of 41 million
passwords, in comparison to the days of training reported for
the Markov [23] or PCFG [36] methods, that were trained on
the similarly-sized “PGS training set”. To train our method
on 113 million passwords, it took only 34.5 minutes, in
comparison to the days it took to train the neural method
[26] on the similarly-sized “PGS++ training set” (see more
details in Section 7.1). Because the PESrank training time
is fast, we are able to train PESrank on a corpus of roughy 8
times the size of the “PGS++ training set”, with 905 million
passwords, and even on this corpus the training only took
4.5 hours.
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Figure 2. Training time as function of the training set size.
Figure 3. Uncompressed size of the 5D+enrichment model as function of
the training set size.
4.8. Storage Requirements
Beyond Table 3, Figure 3 shows the effect of the training
set size on the storage requirements. As we can see, the
required storage grows sub-linearly with the training set size,
reaching 7.5GB with the 905 million passwords training set:
significantly less than the 40GB of the raw Jason corpus, and
well within the capabilities of modern computers.
5. Adding Context
A large corpus such as the Jason corpus [18] includes
passwords obtained from multiple sources. Therefore train-
ing a password model from such a corpus constructs a
general-purpose model that is suitable to estimate the pass-
word strength of many suggested passwords. However, if ad-
ditional information is available to the password cracker, or
the strength estimator, about the user owning the password,
it is advantageous to customize the general-purpose model.
In general we call the additional per-user information the
context. If the password cracking is part of a targetted attack
against an individual, then detailed context information can
come from many sources such as social media or social en-
gineering. However, we argue that context is often available
even to a general purpose password strength estimator—and
that a good estimator should use it. We highlight two easy-
to-obtain sources of context:
1) Site context: In some cases, the password strength
estimator is embedded in a site, to assist users of
that site to pick strong passwords. We hypothe-
size that some users tend to use the name of the
site, or a meaningful part of it, as the base word
in their selected password. Therefore, a password
model customized for such a site should include the
site name and its meaningful parts, with increased
probabilities.
2) Personal context: In many cases, the password
cracker and the password strength estimator have
access to the username or email address associated
with the password—e.g., this data would appear in
a leaked /etc/passwd + /etc/shadow cor-
pus. One could imagine additional context associ-
ated with the password, such as first and last name,
etc. Again, we hypothesize that some users tend to
use their names and other personal context as base
words of their passwords, and if they tend to use
prefixes or suffixes in their username—they may
tend to use the same prefixes or suffixes in their
passwords.
Thus, it may be beneficial to personalize a general-
purpose password model for each suggested password, by
introducing the known context about the password owner
into the model, with elevated probability.
In order to customize a password model, the method
must allow efficient tweaking: adding a few base words,
prefixes or suffixes, with updated a-priori probabilities, that
better model the password choices of the user at hand.
Retraining the whole system with the personal information
for each new password is impractical: e.g., PCFG [36] and
neural [26] report training times measured in days, and even
our PESrank takes minutes-to-hours to train (depending on
the corpus size, recall Figure 2). Conveniently, since PES-
rank uses a very simple model representation—essentially a
sorted probability list of password elements per dimension—
its model is efficient to tweak, without the need to retrain.
5.1. Is per-user context present?
We conducted an evaluation of the above-mentioned
hypotheses using the Jason corpus [18]. The corpus com-
prises of pairs of “username”+password: recall Section 3.2.
However, the usernames in this corpus look like email
addresses: “name@domain.tld”. We used this information
to test both the “Personal context” hypothesis, that the
username provides information about the password, and the
“Site context” hypothesis—assuming that the domain part
of the email address is related to the site from which the
passwords were leaked.
For each username-password pair in the corpus, we
divided the “username” into its name part (the text before
the ‘@’ in the username), which we denoted by name,
and its domain part (the text between the ‘@’ and the
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password prefix == name prefix 0.033%
password base word == name base word 2.478%
password suffix == name suffix 2.570%
password base word == domain 0.088%
password == username 0.062%
TABLE 4. FREQUENCIES OF CONTEXT MATCHES IN THE JASON CORPUS
‘.’ in the username), denoted by domain. We then split
the name into its 3D dimensions, as described in Sec-
tion 3: prefix, base word, and suffix. We split the pass-
word into its 3D dimensions as well. For example, for
the username adam123@myspace.com and the pass-
word *!adam!*, the name is ‘adam123’, its base word
is ‘adam’, which is equal to the password base word. For
the username aaaa111@myspace.com and the password
myspace111 the domain ‘myspace’ is equal to the pass-
word base word, and the name suffix ‘111’ is equal to the
password suffix. We then counted the number of passwords
with:
1) prefix equal to the name prefix.
2) base word equal to the name base word.
3) suffix equal to the name suffix.
4) base word equal to the domain.
5) full password identical to the full username.
Table 4 provides the results. According to Table 4, there
is significant context information in the name’s base word,
and in the name’s suffix: 2.478% and 2.570% respectively.
The prefix dimension of the username seems to carry much
less context, with less than 0.1% of records in the corpus
showing a match.
We therefore conclude that the username in the email ad-
dress carries significant contextual information, specifically
in its base word and suffix, and we argue that the “Personal
context” hypothesis is validated.
Conversely, we find that “Site context” is weak in the
Jason corpus: less that 0.1% of the passwords matched the
domain. A possible reason is that the domain part of the
email address is not a good indicator to the site at which the
password was used. However, we feel that people tendency
to use the site name in their passwords is still a valid
hypothesis, which can be tested with corpora whose origin
is more clear.
For the purposes of password cracking and password
strength estimation, it is reasonable to assume that a-priori,
the password suffix has a 2.570% probability of matching
the name’s suffix, and the a-priori probability the password’s
base word matching name’s base word is 2.478%.
5.2. Using Context in PESrank
Recall that PESrank uses a very simple model represen-
tation: it keeps a sorted probability list of password elements
per dimension. Therefore, all that is required to tweak one
of its dimensions (e.g., adding a base word w with a-priori
probability p) is:
Figure 4. The CDFs of PESrank with and without context, when trained
on 41 million passwords.
• Let p0 be the pre-tweaking probability of w in the
dimension’s probability distribution, and let ∆p =
p − p0. Normalize the probabilities of all the other
words in that dimension by multiplying each with
1−∆p,
• Insert w into its correct place in the sorted order,
with probability p. If w was already present in the
distribution, update its probability to be p.
Note that since the dimension’s list is already sorted, both
insertion and normalization can be done very efficiently,
within seconds, in a single pass of the list, without need
to re-sort.
Beyond its superior training time in comparison to
earlier works, the “tweakability” of PESrank makes using
personal context very practical. It can be done on-line, as
part of the strength estimation of a suggested password:
waiting a some extra seconds during password registration
is not excessive. And certainly using context can be done
during an evaluation study such as ours.
To evaluate the advantages of the username context con-
tribution we used 11,880 password-username pairs from our
test set. First we calculated the strength of each password
using the 5D+ enrichment model using the 41 million train-
ing corpus. Then, for each password, we tweaked the base
word dimension with the name’s base word at probability
2.478%, tweaked the suffix dimension with the name’s suffix
at probability 2.570%, and calculated the strength of the
password using the tweaked model.
Figure 4 shows the results. In general we can see that
adding context improves the estimation, and rank estimates
are provided for 65.5% of the passwords with context,
1.1% more than without context. However, importantly, the
improvement is most noticeable in the left side of the CDF
curves: we can see that, with context, a significant number
of passwords are discovered to be very weak: 20.6% of
the passwords can be cracked with fewer than 106 attempts
when using context, in comparison to 18.4% without con-
text. We conclude that incorporating even the very limited
context present in the username can greatly benefit the
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password cracker, and deserves to be included in the strength
estimate of a proposed password.
6. Modeling Password Reuse
It is well documented that people tend to reuse their
previous passwords, either exactly, or with some variations.
Therefore we hypothesize that knowledge of a user’s pre-
vious passwords can be a powerful source of context when
cracking her current new password. Conveniently, the Jason
corpus [18] allows us to quantify the amount of information
a password cracker gains from such historical knowledge.
By a simple search of the Jason corpus [18] we discov-
ered that many users reuse their password exactly. Specifi-
cally, as in Section 5.1, we extracted the name part of each
username, and we found that for 22% of the records in
the corpus there exists at least one more record with the
same name and the same current password. In this search we
made the plausible assumption that all the email addresses
of the form adam123@domain.tld belong to the same
person. This 22% statistic may actually be an underestimate,
since it does not take into account the manipulations that
users employ (e.g., retaining the base word and changing the
prefix or suffix when setting passwords on different sites).
Therefore, when cracking, or evaluating the strength of a
user’s password, if we know previous passwords belonging
to a user with the same name, it is reasonable to assume
that one of her known passwords or their variants is being
reused with an a-priori probability of 22%.
We used this information as a personal context to cus-
tomize PESrank in the following way: For each user in the
test set:
1) Let L denote the list of all the passwords (whose
length is greater than 8 and contain only ASCII) in
the Jason corpus [18] that belong to usernames with
the same name, excluding the current password.
2) Calculate the frequency f of each unique password
in L.
3) Split each password in L into its 3D dimensions.
4) Add or update the context of each prefix/base
word/suffix dimension so its corresponding prob-
ability will be 0.22·f (as in Section 5.2), and nor-
malize the distributions.
We sampled 5,000 username-password pairs from our
test set, and evaluated their strength with the context-aware
PESrank using both the username context of Section 5.2 and
the password-reuse context (if such context was available),
when our model is trained on 41 million passwords. Figure 5
compares its CDF to that of the 5D+ model (as in Figure 1).
The figure clearly shows that when using both username and
password-reuse context, there is a dramatic improvement in
the cracking power (and conversely, a dramatic decrease in
password strength). Again, the most important improvement
is on the left side of the CDF: 42.8% of the passwords can be
cracked with fewer than 106 attempts when using password-
reuse context.
Figure 5. The CDFs of PESrank with and without password-reuse context,
when trained on 41 million passwords.
We draw several conclusion from this experiment. First,
we find that indeed knowing the user’s previous passwords
provides the password cracker with very valuable informa-
tion. Second, that a good password strength estimator should
use such history as context, to accurately model the cracker’s
capability—and that resources such as Jason’s corpus [18]
already provide a wealth of historical data on millions of
users. And third, that the PESrank algorithm is well suited
to use such context.
7. Comparison with Existing Methods
7.1. Overview
In order to test the power and accuracy of our method,
we compared it to multiple approaches. We first compared
its guessing power, and its storage requirements, to those
of five accurate cracker-based methods offered in PGS [4]:
(1) the Markov model [23]; (2) the PCFGs model [36] with
Komanduri‘s improvements [21]; (3) Hashcat [17]; (4) John
the Ripper [28] mangled dictionary models; and (5) the
neural network-based model of Melicher et al. (with Monte-
Carlo estimation) [26]. Then we tested the accuracy of
PESrank as an estimator, versus the currently best heuristic
estimator, zxcvbn [37], [38].
In all cases we used the algorithms’ default settings and
training data. We implemented PESrank in Python.
Since we used the implementations of Neural, PCFG,
Markov, hashcat and JtR, as made publicly available through
the PGS service, we had no control over the corpora the PGS
administrators used to train all these algorithms—nor do we
have the precise set of corpora that they used. According to
the PGS site, they trained the PCFG, Markov, hashcat and
JtR algorithms on 6 corpora, totalling 33 million passwords,
plus 6 million natural language words, collectively called
the “PGS training set”. The Neural algorithm was trained on
passwords from 26 corpora, totalling 105 million passwords
plus 6 million natural language words, called the “PGS++
training set”. As far as we can tell the Jason [18] corpus
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Figure 6. The CDFs of PESrank versus PCFG, Markov, Hashcat and JtR,
when PESrank is trained on 41 million passwords and the other methods
are trained on the PGS training set.
Figure 7. The CDFs of PESrank versus Neural, when PESrank is trained
on 113 million passwords and Neural is trained on the PGS++ training set.
includes all the passwords that are in the PGS++ training
set.
Therefore, to have a fair comparison, we trained PES-
rank on two training sets: one containing 41 million pass-
words, for comparison with the PCFG, Markov, hashcat and
JtR algorithms, and one containing 113 million passwords
for comparison with the Neural algorithm. We also trained
PESrank method on larger training sets (226 million, 452
million and 905 million passwords) in order to see how the
training set size affects its method performance.
7.2. Comparison to Cracker-based Methods
Figure 6 shows the CDFs comparing PESrank, trained
on 41 million passwords with PCFG, Markov, hashcat and
JtR algorithms, that are trained on the same corpus size
(PGS).
The figure shows that PESrank outperforms other ap-
proaches for “practically crackable” passwords. Up to ranks
around 1011, PESrank is able to crack a higher percentage of
passwords in the test set, and do it with fewer attempts than
Figure 8. The CDFs of all the method, when each method is trained on all
the passwords available to it: PESrank trained on the 905 million password
corpus, Neural trained on the PGS++ training set, and the rest trained on
the PGS training set.
the other methods. While PCFG is able to provide lower
ranks for passwords beyond rank 1011, we argue that it
is more valuable to the user to learn that her password is
crackable, versus just how uncrackable it is (e.g. for a PCFG
rank of 1014).
Figure 7 shows the results comparing PESrank, trained
on 113 million passwords, with the Neural method which
is trained on a similar corpus size (PGS++). Again, we see
that PESrank outperforms the Neural method for “practically
crackable” passwords, while Neural is able to better estimate
the strengths of the very strong passwords.
As a side note, the Neural algorithm is apparently able
to provide a rank for every possible password, and its
CDF always reaches 100%: we tested it on 20-character
passwords, including letters, digits and symbols, generated
uniformly at random by the “Random.pw - Random Pass-
word Generator” [31]. On such passwords Neural returned
strength estimations of about 1041 ≈ 2120, which is a fair
estimate assuming 6-bits of entropy per password character.
Thus Neural will always surpass PESrank on the right-hand
side of the CDF, since PESrank will never return a rank that
exceeds the password volume in the model (recall Table 3).
Figure 8 shows the CDFs of all the methods we com-
pared, each trained on the maximal training set available to
it. When PESrank is trained on a 905 million password train-
ing set, its advantage over the other methods, as provided
by the PGS service [4], grows, and only Neural surpasses
PESrank, for ranks beyond 1012. While this figure mostly
demonstrates the advantage of using a larger training set,
it also shows that PESrank is actually able to digest such
a large training set, due to its fast training time, whereas
the other methods’ ability to do so in reasonable time is
currently unknown.
7.3. Storage Requirements
Table 5 summarizes the storage space of the different
methods, as reported by [26]—where, unlike in the PGS
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PCFG Markov Hashcat JtR Neural PESrank
4.7GB 1.1GB 756MB 756MB 60MB 1.4GB
TABLE 5. STORAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VARIOUS METHODS AS
REPORTED BY [26] WHEN ALL METHODS ARE TRAINED ON THE PGS++
CORPUS AND PESRANK IS TRAINED ON 113 MILLION PASSWORDS.
service [4], the authors trained the earlier methods on the
PGS++ training set. For comparison we provide the PESrank
storage for the training set of size 113 million passwords.
The table shows that the Neural network requires the lowest
amount of storage (60MB) on the server-side, while PES-
rank requires a larger, yet very reasonable 1.4GB storage,
and significantly less than PCFG.
7.4. Comparison to a Heuristic Estimator
We also compared the accuracy of PESrank with that
of the zxcvbn [38], [37] heuristic. We used the open source
Python code of zxcvbn [38].
As a ground truth for this comparison, for each pass-
word, we used the minimum number of attempts needed
to guess a password by running PGS [4], in its MIN AUTO
configuration mode. In this mode PGS returns the minimum
number of guesses among (1) the Markov model[23]; (2) the
PCFG model [36] with Komanduri‘s improvements [21]; (3)
Hashcat [17]; (4) John the Ripper [28] mangled dictionary
models; and (5) Neural Networks [26] (with Monte-Carlo
estimation).
7.4.1. Estimator Quality Metrics. We used several metrics
to evaluate the quality of the estimator. Following [38], given
a test set S, on each sampled password xi ∈ S we measure
an algorithm‘s estimation error by computing its order-of
magnitude difference ∆i the from the PGS ground-truth:
∆i = log10
galg(xi)
gpgs(xi)
(1)
where galg is the rank estimate of the algorithm and gpgs is
the minimum rank of the five PGS methods. Note that ∆i
can be positive (if the algorithm over-estimates the ground
truth) or negative if it under-estimates.
We also define the following three metrics: over-
estimation, accurate and under-estimation, which give a
sense of how frequently an estimated rank is significantly
above or below the ground-truth and how frequently it is
close to the ground truth. Specifically, over-estimation is the
fraction of passwords for which the estimated rank is two
orders of magnitude (×100) more than ground-truth, and
similarly for under-estimation. accurate is the fraction of
passwords for which the estimated rank is within two orders
of magnitude from the ground truth. Using the definition of
∆i we obtain the following expressions:
over-estimation =
1
|S| |{xi ∈ S : ∆i > 2}| (2)
accurate =
1
|S| |{xi ∈ S : −2 ≤ ∆i ≤ 2}| (3)
Figure 9. The fractions of over-estimation, accurate, and under-estimation
of PESrank and zxcvbn with a test set of 30,000 passwords.
under-estimation =
1
|S| |{xi ∈ S : ∆i < −2}| (4)
7.4.2. Accuracy Comparison. In Figure 9 we see the over-
and under- estimation of PESrank and zxcvbn using the
metrics defined in Section 7.4.1. The figure shows that the
PESrank method is more accurate than the zxcvbn: our
model has the highest total number of passwords correlated
with the ground truth.
Moreover, the figure shows that zxcvbn under-estimates
43.87% of the passwords: i.e., significant numbers of un-
safe errors. In contrast, PESrank is more aligned with the
ground-truth, only over-estimating 4.56% of the passwords
and under-estimating 21.21% of them. Notice that PESrank
under-estimation is actually advantageous, since PESrank is
backed by a model-based password cracking algorithm that
can achieve its predictions. It means that such a cracker can
do better than the “ground-truth”.
8. Lookup Time Optimizations
The basic lookup time of the PESrank includes: (1) read-
ing the five distributions lists from the five files into memory
(2) mapping the given password string into the correspond-
ing probability (3) calculating the estimated strength using
the ESrank algorithm [7]. The ESrank algorithm [7] receives
as input d distribution lists and a password probability, uses
exponential sampling to merge the d lists into two, and then
calculates the upper and the lower bounds of the rank of the
given probability using these two merged lists.
Figure 6 summarizes the PESrank 5D+ lookup time,
when trained with 41 million passwords, in three modes:
basic, amortized and with context.
In its basic mode it took 40 seconds to read the 5 files
into the RAM and 6.5 seconds to map the password into
probability and calculate the estimations.
However, in a large scale test such as ours, it is possible
to perform the main parts of the PESrank calculations once
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Basic 5D+ Amortized 5D+ Amortized 5D+ with context
46.5sec 0.002 sec 8.5013 sec
TABLE 6. THE LOOKUP TIME OF A PASSWORD TRAINED ON 41
MILLION PASSWORDS
for a batch of passwords to speed up the evaluation. Clearly
reading the 5 distribution lists in memory can be done
once for the entire password batch. Further, the ESrank
merge step (from 5 lists into 2 lists) does not depend on
the probability of the given password, but only on the 5
distribution lists, thus it can be pre-computed once and be
kept in the memory. Amortizing the one-time computations
over 30,000 passwords in a test set we get that the PESrank
look up time per password, when trained with 41 million
passwords, is 0.002 seconds.
We cannot use the full pre-computation when using
context, since the context changes the dimension distribution
lists for each password. Therefore we need to read the 5
distribution lists (once), tweak them, and run the full ESrank
for each password. The tweaking time when trained on 41
million passwords is 2.5 seconds, leading to an amortized
time of PESrank with context to be 8.5013 seconds.
The ESrank algorithm [7] uses exponentially sampling,
which depends on a tunable parameter γ that effects the
accuracy of the rank estimation and the memory footprint of
the two lists. In [7] the authors showed that the ratio between
the upper bound estimation and the lower bound estimation
of a given password is bounded by γ2d−2, therefore with d =
5 we chose γ to be 1.09 to achieve an estimation accuracy
of less than 1 bit. As a result of this choice, the memory
we need for these two final merged lists is
∑d
i=1 logγ(ni) =
logγ(
∏d
1=1 ni). For example, using the 41 million password
training set, the volume of the 5d+enrichment model, from
table 3, is 1.28 · 1027, therefore the memory requirement of
the two ESrank lists is log1.09(1.28 · 1027) · 8byte=5.8KB,
which is negligible.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we presented the first method for estimating
the strength of human-chosen text passwords that is able
to tweak the estimation according to each user’s personal
context, without retraining its model.
Our method is able to incorporate context such as the
user’s name, preferred suffix, or previously cracked pass-
words (if available) when estimating the current password’s
strength. Based on the Jason corpus of leaked passwords
[18], which contains 1.4 billion usernames and passwords,
we demonstrated that there is significant correlation between
the user’s name and the chosen password, and that users’
likelihood of reusing a password is as high as 22%. Since
our method’s context-aware tweaking only takes a few
seconds per password, our strength estimations show that
many passwords are in fact much weaker than previously
estimated, once context is taken into account.
Our idea is to cast the question in a probabilistic frame-
work used in side-channel cryptography. We view each pass-
word as a point in a d-dimensional search space, and learn
the probability distribution of each dimension separately.
The a-priori probability of a given password is the product
of the d probabilities of its sub-passwords.
After a detailed evaluation of leaked password corpora
we found that an effective choice is to use d = 5 dimensions:
base word, prefix, suffix, shift-pattern, and l33t transforma-
tion. We coupled this decomposition with a state-of-the-art
rank estimation algorithm to create the tweakable PESrank
estimator.
We showed that PESrank is more powerful than previous
methods: it can crack more passwords, with fewer attempts,
than the password crackers we compared it to. Even with-
out using per-user context, PESrank is more accurate than
previous methods for crackable passwords whose rank is
smaller than 1012. Furthermore, its training time is drasti-
cally shorter than previous methods, taking minutes, rather
than days, to train on comparably-sized training sets, and
taking a few hours to train on 905 million passwords, which
is 8 times more than previously used.
Since PESrank can estimate a password strength in sec-
onds, is tweakable and able to incorporate context, and uses
storage and memory that is easily available on a standard
computer, we believe that PESrank can be a useful password
strength estimator.
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